Cake Cutting Mechanisms

• Published in 2012
• Added on 2012-04-07

We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.

Links

• http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.0100
• http://arxiv.org/pdf/1203.0100v2

Other information

BibTeX entry

@article{Ianovski2012,
	key = {Ianovski2012},
	type = {article},
	title = {Cake Cutting Mechanisms},
	author = {Ianovski, Egor},
	abstract = {We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.},
	comment = {},
	date_added = {2012-04-07},
	date_published = {2012-03-01},
	urls = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.0100,http://arxiv.org/pdf/1203.0100v2},
	collections = {Puzzles,Easily explained,Protocols and strategies,Food},
	archivePrefix = {arXiv},
	arxivId = {1203.0100},
	eprint = {1203.0100},
	journal = {October},
	month = {mar},
	number = {March},
	url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.0100 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1203.0100v2},
	year = 2012,
	primaryClass = {cs.GT},
	urldate = {2012-04-07}
}