# Cake Cutting Mechanisms

• Published in 2012
In the collections
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.

## Other information

arxivId
1203.0100
journal
October
number
March

### BibTeX entry

@article{Ianovski2012,
abstract = {We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
arxivId = {1203.0100},
author = {Ianovski, Egor},
eprint = {1203.0100},
journal = {October},
month = {mar},
number = {March},
title = {Cake Cutting Mechanisms},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1203.0100 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1203.0100v2},
year = 2012,
primaryClass = {cs.GT},
urldate = {2012-04-07},
collections = {Puzzles,Easily explained,Protocols and strategies,Food}
}